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Article 2

FOREWORD: HOLMES'
RichardA Posner'
A century and a half after his birth and two-thirds of a
century after his retirement, Holmes remains the towering
figure of American law. I think it is reasonably easy to explain
why he towers so and also why there is unprecedented
scholarly interest, illustrated by this conference, in him. But
those are two easy questions about Holmes. The difficult
questions are three, and they are interpretive, causal, and
evaluative, respectively. The first is, what exactly does Holmes
"stand for"-what is the meaning of his career, what is the
structure, unity, or development of his thought? The second
question is, why did he hold the views he did? And third, now
that we have a fairly long perspective from which to appraise
him, how should we rate him-as the greatest judge and legal
scholar in our history or as something less, even as something
bad? I shall offer tentative answers to all five questions in the
hope of providing a framework in which to evaluate the
subsequent presentations at the conference. My answers will
be brief and dogmatic, rather than elaborately reasoned and
substantiated. They are intended merely to stimulate thought.
Part of the reason that Holmes remains the towering
figure of American law is that he was literally a towering
figure-a tall and striking man with a famous name and a
heroic war record. But this is only a small part. I mean no
disrespect to Byron White to point out that White is another
brilliant lawyer who was a Supreme Court Justice and who
has a heroic war record and is tall and striking. And if he does
not have a famous family name he has something better in our
©1997 Richard A. Posner. All Rights Reserved.
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times-athletic distinction. But he will never tower as Holmes
towers. The difference lies in professional accomplishment.
Although White was a competent judge and before that a
competent practitioner and distinguished Deputy Attorney
General, Holmes wrote the most important book in the history
of American legal scholarship, The Common Law, and one of
the most important articles, The Path of the Law.' He wrote a
number of other influential articles as well. He topped off
these academic achievements by becoming one of the most
influential Supreme Court Justices in history, who left a
profound imprint on the law of free speech, habeas corpus,
federalism, substantive due process, and on the concept of
judicial self-restraint. He wrote the most famous dissents in
the history of the American judiciary; and he was the best
writer that American law has produced, with a gift for the
memorable epigram. He was also immensely prolific. I believe
(without being certain) that he wrote more opinions than any
other U.S. Supreme Court Justice, even though he was over
sixty when appointed to the Court; and when you add the
opinions he wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts he probably wrote more published opinions
than any judge in United States history--not to mention more
than ten thousand letters, most of publishable quality. Apart
from their rhetorical brilliance, his opinions are shot through
with philosophical and even economic insights. His influence
and achievement surpass that of any other figure in the
history of American law, and would be hardly less noteworthy
or noted, at least within the academic and legal professions,
had he lacked those features of personal history that he shares
with Justice White.
That there should be considerable scholarly interest in a
figure of such importance to the law is natural. But the recent
surge in that interest is, I believe, largely a result of developments internal to academic law, and to social thought more
generally, having little to do with Holmes per se. One
development is the greater theoretical emphasis of modern
academic law, which deflects the interest of many academic
lawyers from commentary on current legal problems to history,
biography, ideology, politics, judicial behavior, the relations of
1
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law to other fields, and jurisprudence-all areas to which the
study of Holmes might contribute. Another development,
possibly a belated effect of the Freudian revolution in
psychology (explicitly so, in the case of Morton Horwitz's recent
irresponsible speculations about the psychological foundations
of The Path of the Law), 2 is the American public's avidity for
the revelatory biography, an avidity increasingly shared by the
legal profession, including its academic branch. We want to
know what made Holmes tick; we hope it might be something
to do with sex, and the publication of his letters to Clare
Castletown quickened that hope. Sheldon Novickes recent,
essentially baseless conjecture that Holmes had a homosexual
relationship with Henry James in 1865 represents the reductio
ad absurdum of this approach.'
I move now to the more difficult questions, which I called
interpretive, causal, and evaluative. Given Holmes's enormous
written output, which amounts to tens of thousands of pages of
essays, opinions, and letters, it might seem that only patient
diligence is required in order to determine his stance on every
issue in jurisprudence and politics, and whether it was
consistent over his long lifetime, and what therefore might be
described as his dominant bent or bents, his "mentality."
Despite Horwitz's argument to the contrary, there is (and here
I draw on the authority of Professor Thomas C. Grey, whom I
consider the foremost student of Holmes's thought) very little
evidence that Holmes changed his basic outlook over his long
life;4 there is not an early Holmes and a late Holmes in the
way there is an early and a late Wittgenstein or even an early
and a late Harry Blackmun and George Kennan, let alone the
dizzy gyrations that one encounters in the thought of Bertrand
Russell. And yet there is unending debate over whether
Holmes is better described as a formalist or a realist, a
pragmatist or a logical positivist, a liberal or a reactionary, a
Puritan or a Social Darwinist.

2
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I do not think the debate can be resolved (and only partly
because of the vague contours of some of these terms);
therefore I think it is futile. The debate presupposes that the
average person, and even more clearly the exceptional person,
is synchronically although not necessarily diachronically
consistent-that he or she is a unity at every point in time and
indeed over substantial intervals, but not necessarily over the
life span. A person is allowed to have phases; normally just
two-early and late-but occasionally three-early, middle,
and late. He is also or instead allowed to develop in a more or
less linear or at least continuous fashion. But he is not
permitted to hold contrary views at the same time or otherwise
than in accordance with phases or a line of development. This
is a psychologically unrealistic model. A highly imaginative
and intellectual person, such as Holmes, is apt to resemble
Leopold Bloom in Joyce's Ulysses in having a mind that is a
buzzing hive of thoughts shooting off in different directions. If
his career involves writing, he will endeavor to make a
consistent selection from the hive. But suppose that for one
reason or another he writes down almost everything that floats
through his mind. Then an attempt to reconstruct his
"thought," his stance or "take," will just reproduce the hive.
This is almost the situation in which Holmes found himself. As
a judge, he had to write up his thoughts on a vast number of
cases whether or not the particular case fit some program of
exposition that he might have devised. He had to react to each
case as it came along, and because he was an impatient
worker, the firstlings of his thought were pretty much the
firstlings of his writing hand, if I may be permitted to garble
Macbeth. Meanwhile he had to, or more precisely wanted to,
answer the numerous letters that he received from his pen
pals. He did not make copies of the letters, and may not have
expected them to be retained, let alone published, but they
have been published (more precisely, they are being
published-only a small fraction have been published as yet);
and the dignity of print makes them specimens of his thought
level with his opinions. The opinions are more polished; often a
thought first appears in a letter, and later in more polished
and pithy form in an opinion or article. Holmes wrote one book
and a number of articles, and these (the book especially) were
probably his most deliberate compositions. But he also gave a
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number of after dinner and ceremonial speeches-rightly called
"occasional" because the occasion shapes both form and
substance. One is constrained, in speaking at a memorial
service, an honorary-degree ceremony, or a gathering of
veterans, in what one says, as well as how and how long one
says it.
The book, the articles, and the "occasional" speeches round
out, together with some better or worse substantiated
anecdotes, the diverse, the enormous, and naturally, the
inconsistent corpus of Holmes's thought. How could one expect
consistency in such a vast miscellany, much of it consisting of
hasty thoughts elicited by highly specific occasions, whether
judicial, epistolary, or declamatory?
The principal inconsistencies are between rather than
within genres. As Professor Grey has shown, the Holmes of the
opinions is more formalistic and positivistic, especially in
contract cases and in matters of interpretation and stare
decisis, than the Holmes of the book and the articles (notably
The Path of the Law), though there are a number of
exceptions-dissents generally, such as Abrams v. United
States5 and especially Olmstead v. United States,' but also the
"three generations of imbeciles" opinion (Buck v. Bell),' the
attractive nuisance opinion (United Zinc & Chemical Co. v.
Britt),8 and a number of other majority opinions as well. The
"liberal" Holmes that so entranced the New Deal generation is
found mainly in the opinions, where his private views are
usually masked (again, Buck v. Bell is a conspicuous
exception). The letters and early speeches are where we find
the "reactionary" Holmes-the militarist, the my-country-rightor-wrong nationalist, the Social Darwinist, the eugenicist, the
Republican who votes for Warren Harding, the admirer of the
robber barons, the laissez faire economist who thinks the
Sherman Act, in his word, a "humbug." The letters and articles
are the principal site of the philosophical Holmes, but no
consistent philosophy is discernable-his philosophical writings
(jottings or fragments would be a more accurate description)

250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
s 258 U.S. 268, 274 (1922).
6
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are a fog through which now a Nietzschean lightning flash,
now a Peircian, now a Wittgensteinian, now a Sartrean, now a
Calvinist, now a Pyrrhonian can be glimpsed. We get
occasional glimpses of the philosophical Holmes in the opinions
as well, as in the paraphrase of Peirce in the Abrams dissent.9
Two things that mislead readers of Holmes are, first, the
difference in writing styles between his generation and ours
and, second, the tendency of a gifted writer to overstate. To the
modern ear, the prose of the nineteenth century often sounds
at once militant, brusque, and flowery, inviting misleading
psychological inferences. I think Holmes's biographers, in
reading his letters to Lady Castletown, mistake passionate
style for sexual content. As for the tendency to overstate, I
sense that Holmes was sometimes carried away by the sheer
pleasure of writing arresting, even shocking, aphoristic prose:
he could not resist a line like "Three generations of imbeciles
are enough."'0 He did not always pause to think whether such
formulas exactly (let alone tactfully) expressed what he meant.
He was a self-indulgent writer-for which those of us who
have an aesthetic outlook are grateful.
I turn now to the causal question. Why did Holmes hold
the views he did? Anterior to that question is a selection from
among those views of the ones that the questioner considers
most significant, most interesting, or most tenaciously held,
which are likely to include Holmes's Social Darwinism, his
scientism (and atheism), his legal positivism, and his legal
realism. The most popular explanation for this cluster is
Holmes's war service-three years as an infantry officer in
America's bloodiest war, three serious wounds (two that were
life-threatening), followed by a decision not to re-enlist.
Although Holmes was very young, and most young people are
very resilient, and life was harder and early death more
common in the nineteenth century than it is today, it is
certainly plausible that the experience he went through left a
deep mark on his thought and character. But this is no more
than plausible. As with many historical and biographical
counterfactuals, it is impossible to confirm. Holmes's mature
views were common enough among persons who avoided
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

1o Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
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military service in the Civil War (often by hiring substitutes to
fight in their stead). Civilians who get into positions where
they can order out the troops are often notably bellicose, as we
learned during the Vietnam War, and ex-soldiers are often
pacific-which Holmes was not.
The second most popular explanation for Holmes's mature
view is his character (which may, of course, have been
influenced by his wartime experiences). He is commonly said to
have been cold, ambitious, rivalrous, possibly soured by the
declining influence of the "aristocratic" caste to which he
belonged (especially on his mother's side), preternaturally
detached, "Olympian," Puritanical, possibly even sexless-so
that his childlessness is deemed the result of deliberate choice
or a concomitant of his character, rather than, as it probably
was, the result of his wife's contracting rheumatic fever shortly
after their marriage. Ambitious for distinction he was, and
rivalrous with his father and his boyhood friends (such as
William and Henry James), but for the other lineaments in the
character portrait that I just sketched there is no evidence.
The picture that emerges from those thousands of pages of
writings, and from the recollections of people who knew
Holmes personally-with a suitable discount applied to the
disparaging comments by those rivalrous friends, notably
William James-is quite different. This Holmes, especially in
the letters and in the reports by people who knew him, is
warm, humorous, playful, epicurean, cultured, slightly offcolor, tolerant, courteous, optimistic, curious, young in spirit,
commonsensical, susceptible to flattery, witty, anecdotal,
gallant, and kindly. Most of his letters date from his old age,
yet the animating spirit of the letters is a joie de vivre
inconsistent with the picture of the grim Civil War survivor
and penny-pinching Yankee that some of Holmes's critics and
biographers have tried to peddle.
Indeed, what is striking about Holmes the person is that
there is no evidence of neurosis, war-induced or otherwise. He
seems to have been a psychologically normal person of unusual
physical health, intellectual ability, family circumstance, and
luck (except possibly in the matter of children-about which he
said he did not care that he was childless, but that may have
been the fox without the tail talking). The effort at

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 7

psychobiography seems, in his case, bound to fail." I am
struck by the naivet6 of the psychological speculation about
Holmes. The idea that people whose cast of mind is skeptical,
Darwinian, and atheistic (I pass on the question of whether
skepticism and atheism are actually consistent), rather than
spiritual and redemptive, are personally bleak and cold, or the
converse-that philosophies of uplift are characteristically
produced or embraced by sweeties--does not correspond to my
own experience of people.
And was Holmes's philosophy in fact bleak and cold? That
is the conventional view, but I do not think it is right. His was,
or at least he pretended it was, a no-nonsense scientific
outlook, one that denied that the universe has a purpose or
that we are the wards of a deity or that death is not oblivion.
But the scientific outlook is not typically, or in Holmes's case,
pessimistic; the roots of the cultural pessimism of a Henry
Adams, or a Spengler, or, to use a contemporary legal example,
a Bork, are not in science. The scientific outlook does not reject
the possibility of awe, wonder, and thrilled anticipation.
Geological, biological, technological, and social evolution, after
all, mindless as these processes are (even, to a significant
extent, the technological and the social), have produced many
wonders; they will produce many more. Holmes in fact was an
optimist, and while I resolved to make this a different kind of
paper about Holmes by not larding it with quotations from my
eminently quotable subject, I do want to give you one
quotation, from the end of one of his after dinner speeches,
that I think will cinch my point:
I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares
a chamber for the winged thing it never has seen but is to be-that
man may have cosmic destinies that he does not understand. And so
beyond the vision of battling races and an impoverished earth I
catch a dreaming glimpse of peace.
The other day my dream was pictured to my mind. It was
evening. I was walking homeward on Pennsylvania Avenue near the

Treasury, and as I looked beyond Sherman's Statue to the west the
sky was aflame with scarlet and crimson from the setting sun. But,

n A point made in Adam Hirsch's critical review of G. Edward White's
biography of Holmes. See Adam J. Hirsch, Searching Inside Justice Holmes, 82 VA.
L. REV. 385, 400, 406 (1996) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993)).
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like the note of downfall in Wagner's opera, below the sky line there
came from little globes the pallid discord of the electric lights. And I
thought to myself that GtterdAmmerung will end, and from those
globes clustered like evil eggs will come the new masters of the sky.
It is like the time in which we live. But then I remembered the faith
that I partly have expressed, faith in a universe not measured by
our fears, a universe that has thought and more than thought inside
of it, and as I gazed, after the sunset and above the electric lights
there shone the stars.'

That word "faith" is a clue to the fact that one can be a
warm tough-talking atheist. I am put in mind, as I often am
when reading Holmes, of Nietzsche's remark in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra:"[mian is a bridge and no end: proclaiming himself blessed in view of his noon and evening, as the way to new
dawns.""3 Louis Menand, in an interesting recent article,
stresses Holmes's sense of the pervading uncertainty of the
world;' 4 but for a person of optimistic bent, that uncertainty
is a joy; it magnifies possibilities.
The most plausible, though strikingly uninteresting, explanation for Holmes's dominant or characteristic ideas is that
from his father, a distinguished scientist as well as a poet,
family friends such as Emerson (who influenced Nietzsche), the
books Holmes read as a student at Harvard College, his English friends such as James Fitzjames Stephen, and the friends
of his youth such as Peirce and William James, he picked up
the exciting new ideas of the second half of the nineteenth
century, many of which were also the exciting new ideas of the
first half of the twentieth century, and he used them in the
law. Holmes was not an original thinker. His philosophical
significance-and I think he does have philosophical significance-comes from the memorable aphorisms in which he
articulated and to some extent merged into interesting new
combinations the ideas of his Zeitgeist, and from his ability to
work some of those ideas into the law. I think he particularly

" Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:
SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER

WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLIES, JR. 145, 148 (Richard A. Posner ed.,
1992).
"FRIEDRICH NIEZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR ALL AND
NONE 198 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966).

"' Louis Menand, Bet-tabilitarianism:The Principles (Sort o) of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1996, at 47.
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helps us to see that pragmatism is always constrained by what
he called one's "can't helps," one's bedrock intuitions; so that
the fewer or further apart these are-the more skeptical, open,
or uncertain one is-the more pragmatic one will be. Even the
dogmatist is pragmatic, only within narrower limits.
I come finally to the evaluative question: how high should
we rate Holmes? He has not lacked for strong detractors, ever
since Wigmore denounced him for the dissent in Abrams,
which Wigmore thought naive and unpatriotic. At a recent
conference I heard a law professor rate Holmes below Warren
and Brennan-and in fact say he was not a good judge. Yet his
rating by the legal profession as a whole remains high.
I think the reason Holmes is criticized so much is related
to my earlier point about the lack of consistency in his
thought. If you take position X and also position not X, you
open yourself to criticism both by the Xers and by the
antiXers. But the deeper reason why Holmes is a target of
criticism is that most people who write about law are highly
political and cannot easily distinguish political disagreement
from moral or professional deficiency. Before about 1940,
Holmes was generally to the left of the political center of the
legal profession and was criticized mainly by those to the right,
including super patriots like Wigmore, freedom of contract
buffs, and Catholic natural lawyers. From then until about
1960, which I would guess was the high-water mark of
Holmes's reputation, he occupied the center; and in that period, a period of ideological quiescence, the center was very
broad. Since 1960, the center of the profession, especially its
academic branch, swung sharply to the left, leaving Holmes
well to the right and so attracting criticisms from what became
a large left wing of professional and academic opinion. Just as
the left did not want Robert Bork to be on the Supreme Court
because he was such a prestigious and articulate conservative,
so the left wants to dethrone Holmes, a far more prestigious
and articulate "conservative," though a conservative only in the
sense in which today's superegalitarians are "liberal." Holmes
was a classical liberal in the mode of John Stuart Mill but
without Mill's lapses (as they would have seemed to Holmes)
into socialism and feminism.
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Holmes is the victim also of political correctness, or what
might alternatively be called in this context (in a phrase for

which I am indebted to Stephen Holmes) "temporal parochialism." Applied to history and biography, political correctness
requires that people who lived in different times from our own
must nevertheless be held accountable for having failed to
anticipate the sensitivities of today. T.S. Eliot is being tarred
and feathered for sharing the anti-Semitic views of tens of
millions of other residents of Great Britain during the period
between the World Wars. The authors of the Bible are criticized for endowing the deity with male gender. (The gender of
the twelve apostles must be a prima facie violation of Title
VII.) Such criticisms give us moderns the comfortable sense of
being morally superior to almost every one of the billions of
people who predeceased us, though those who make the criticisms are generally not independent thinkers and had they
lived in earlier times would share the prejudices and insensitivities of those times. Because Holmes wrote so much, often
(particularly in his letters) with his guard down, it is easy to
find many instances in which, particularly on matters of race
and sex, he failed to display a 1990s sensibility, though on the
whole his outlook was remarkably tolerant and indeed cosmopolitan by the standards of his generation (he was born in
1841).
If you want to take the measure of a person, you should do
so with reference to his contemporaries, rather than with reference to us. And you should set to one side your political disagreements with the person, recognizing that political agreement is not a criterion when evaluating professional, scientific,
or artistic achievement. At some point political disagreement
does shade into just condemnation, but that point is not
reached with Holmes. His political views that the left finds so
unpalatable are for the most part the views of a Millian liberal, and are as worthy of respectful consideration today as they
were when he expressed them. When we set aside our temporal parochialism, we see what a previous generation saw-that
Holmes was the greatest legal thinker and greatest judge in
our history.

